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About
The Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment (CCSI), a
joint center of Columbia Law School and the Earth Institute
at Columbia University, is the only university-based applied
research center and forum dedicated to the study, practice, and
discussion of sustainable international investment.

Executive Summary
This submission seeks to respond to challenges associated
with implementing, and auditing for compliance with, three
aspects of Bonsucro’s proposed Production Standard V5 (“the
Draft Standard”) and proposes a concrete solution that will
complement Bonsucro operators’ efforts to more effectively
meet that Standard in practice.1
Despite some concerning erosions of inclusive approaches
found in the previous version,2 the Draft Standard sets out
directives, some binding and others not,3 for operators to:
(1) Obtain the free, prior and informed consent (FPIC)
of Indigenous and traditional communities when
establishing or expanding operations4 and when such
communities relinquish any land rights;5
(2) Implement transparent and participatory processes
to assess, monitor, and evaluate the environmental
and social impacts of new and existing projects;6 and
(3) Establish accessible dispute resolution and grievance
mechanisms that allow communities to raise and
resolve problems with the operator.7

These directives indicate a critical need to protect the human
rights, livelihoods, and priorities of local communities by
enabling them to meaningfully participate in and influence
decision-making throughout the life of a sugarcane project.
Yet meaningful community participation in relevant decisionmaking processes is often unachievable without community
access to technical support and empowerment—from
paralegals, lawyers, scientists, among other support providers.
Communities’ need for support in the context of investment
has been acknowledged by the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights8 and the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm
Oil (RSPO),9 as well as experts within the United Nations10 and
World Bank.11
Facilitating affected communities’ access to technical support
also benefits private sector organizations. Specifically, a lack of
community support increases the risk of grievances and conflict,
stemming from issues such as mismatched expectations,
inadequate consultation and participation opportunities for
communities, or onerous community-company agreements.12 A
recent study focusing on the sugarcane sector in Kenya, Malawi,
and Tanzania found that land-related disputes in those countries
often cause long delays, with nearly half of these disputes
lasting over 10 years.13 In addition to these delays, local disputes
and conflict can tarnish reputations and shut entire projects
down. In one case, these disputes risked costing a sugarcane
operation in Malawi as much as US$ 101 million in foregone
revenue, which would reduce its net present value by up to
110%.14 More generally, in a 2018 USAID investor survey, more
than 50% of land-based investment companies surveyed cited
a recent increase in disputes over local community access to
resources and land.15 Successful mitigation strategies reportedly
used by companies included active community engagement
and the establishment of effective grievance mechanisms;16
such processes are more likely to be effectively navigated by
communities who can access relevant technical support.
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One challenge in the facilitation of community access to support
is the question of who pays for that support. In contrast to
operators of large mills and of large-scale sugarcane plantations,
which can generally afford the expertise needed to pursue
investments, local communities often struggle to secure funding
needed to access technical support. To meet this funding gap,
we propose that Bonsucro require operators to make financial
contributions to a Basket Fund for Responsible Investment. By
increasing community access to technical support, a Basket
Fund would help operators to more effectively meet Bonsucro’s
standards with regard to FPIC and community participation in
decision-making, impact assessment and monitoring, as well as
dispute resolution and grievance mechanisms.

Section 1. Our Suggested Solution: a Basket Fund
for Responsible Investment
A Basket Fund for Responsible Investment refers to an
independently administered fund that receives financial
contributions from multiple sources and then makes grants to
pay for technical support for investment-affected communities.
In this case, financial contributors would include Bonsucro
operators whose revenues exceed a certain threshold,
potentially alongside such operators’ financiers, investors, largescale suppliers, and customers, among others. By diversifying
its sources of funding, a Basket Fund can achieve greater
independence of community support, decoupling each financial
contribution to the Basket Fund from the decision-making
process on who will receive the funding. This minimizes the
risk of those financial contributions exacerbating the operator’s
actual or perceived undue influence over the community or
support provider.
Requiring operators to make regular financial contributions to
a Basket Fund for Responsible Investment would also assist
Bonsucro to more effectively monitor operator compliance with
its Production Standard. Payments from operators into a Basket
Fund would be an easily auditable indicator to help Bonsucro
measure, and help operators demonstrate, operator compliance
with the elements of Bonsucro’s standards on informed and
empowered community participation in investment-related
decision-making processes.
While a Basket Fund for Responsible Investment is a relatively
novel solution, it is also feasible. Different types of basket funds
have already been established by a multi-stakeholder initiative
(MSI)17 and by industry actors,18 and mandatory investor
contributions to a basket fund for community legal assistance is
even included in Sierra Leone’s National Land Policy,19 indicating
host government openness to such a solution.
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Regular financial contributions by operators to a Basket
Fund for Responsible Investment can facilitate operator
compliance with the Draft Standard’s requirements for FPIC
and appropriate community participation in decision-making,
impact assessment and monitoring, and dispute resolution and
grievance mechanisms. The Draft Standard should, therefore,
incorporate one of the three options below to require operators
to make regular financial contributions for the financing of
independent support to affected communities. In each case,
the Draft Standard should include core indicators and/or
guidance that explicitly mention Basket Fund contributions as
one necessary, but not in itself sufficient, measure operators
must take towards the implementation of the Draft Standard’s
ultimate requirements for FPIC and community participation
in decision-making, impact assessment and monitoring, and
dispute resolution and grievance mechanisms.
Option 1. Bonsucro could facilitate the establishment of a
Basket Fund for Responsible Investment, with appropriate
arrangements for independent and autonomous
operation, and the Draft Standard could require relevant
operators to make financial contributions into it.
Option 2. The Draft Standard could require relevant
Bonsucro operators to make financial contributions into
an appropriate external Basket Fund where such a
fund exists.
Option 3. The Draft Standard could impose a more general
requirement for relevant Bonsucro operators to make
financial contributions towards independent community
support, in ways that do not jeopardize the independence
of that support. This would include contributions to a
Basket Fund, among other approaches, but would not
usually include the operator directly paying the support
provider, as doing so introduces unacceptable risks of
perceived or actual undue influence.20
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Section 1.1. FPIC and Community Participation in DecisionMaking
The Draft Standard should explicitly require operators to
make financial contributions to a Basket Fund for Responsible
Investment as a part of their efforts to meet the Draft Standard’s
requirement21 to obtain the free, prior and informed consent
(FPIC) of Indigenous and traditional communities.22
FPIC refers to the right of a community or people to participate
in decision-making on issues relevant to their well-being and to
give or withhold consent to any project or policy that would affect
them or their lands or resources. The components of FPIC include:
1.
2.

3.
4.

Free: Community members give or withhold consent
voluntarily, without coercion, intimidation,
or manipulation.
Prior: Consent is obtained well before each stage
of project authorization, and is actively sought and
maintained on an ongoing basis throughout the life of
a project.23 This means that while the Draft Standard
expressly calls for FPIC “before any operations are
established or expanded,” the invocation of the FPIC
standard actually entails ongoing, iterative FPIC
processes throughout the life of the sugarcane project.
Informed: Community members access, understand,
and deliberate on all relevant project information
before giving or withholding consent.
Consent: Community decisions to agree, refuse, or offer
conditional consent to projects or activities that affect
their land or resources are respected.

It will often not be possible to obtain a community’s FPIC if
community members do not have access to the technical
support and skill development needed to access and understand
information about the project, deliberate internally, navigate
processes to influence decision-making, and, where they are
willing to grant actual or conditional consent, negotiate the terms
of such consent. For example, a recent decision by the Roundtable
on Sustainable Palm Oil’s Complaints Panel found an agribusiness
plantation operator in breach of applicable requirements to obtain
the FPIC of an affected community during community-company
negotiations in part because of a likely lack of legal support. In
particular, the Complaints Panel found that “[t]he element of
“informed” [in the requirement to obtain free, prior and informed
consent] was not complied with as the investigation found the
community members had very limited information prior to the
signing of the MoU” and that “[t]he limited understandings of the
provisions of the MoU found among the community members […]
further suggests that no legal advice was received to interpret the
rather legal language used in the MoU.”24

Such support to communities requires funding. While some
companies have sought to directly finance technical support
to communities,25 this approach brings a considerable risk
of introducing actual or perceived undue influence over
community beneficiaries. One solution to this challenge is a
Basket Fund that receives financial contributions from Bonsucro
operators and then independently grants funding for technical
support to communities in relation to a relevant sugarcane
production process.
Making contributions to a Basket Fund can help operators
more effectively meet Bonsucro’s standards while also
strengthening their local relationships and improving their
decision-making processes. Basket funds lead to more prepared
and communicative communities, helping operators to better
understand and incorporate community perspectives into project
design and decisions and reducing the risks of costly conflict.
MSIs focusing on sustainable production have also experienced
a number of challenges in ensuring operator compliance with
their standards. For example, in one study, MSI auditors were
found to have a “flawed” and “weak” understanding of the
applicable MSI standard, particularly relating to social criteria
like FPIC and customary rights of affected communities;26 this
resulted in “faulty” assessments and companies proceeding
with their investments despite being in “serious violation” of
FPIC and High Conservation Value (HCV) requirements.27 While
never sufficient in itself to prove that FPIC has been obtained,
proof of each operator’s financial contributions to a Basket Fund
would be an easily auditable indicator of concrete actions taken
by the operator as part of broader efforts to obtain the FPIC of
affected communities, thus helping Bonsucro to track operator
commitment to, and compliance with, the Bonsucro Standard.

Section 1.2. Impact Assessment and Monitoring
The Draft Standard should explicitly require operators to
make financial contributions to a Basket Fund for Responsible
Investment as a part of their efforts to meet the Draft
Standard’s requirement of inclusive impact assessment and
monitoring processes. 28
The Draft Standard requires that new projects and greenfield
expansions be covered by environmental and social impact
assessments (ESIAs). The guidance to the core indicator for
this requirement states that the ESIA “shall start prior to the
formulation phase of a project, focus on significant issues
and identify stakeholders to involve them, consider impacts
on individuals with special consideration for vulnerable ones,
and provide information on possible alternative or appropriate
mitigation measures.”29 It also notes that ESIA-related decisions
“shall be based on meaningful engagement with affected
stakeholders (as defined by OECD), monitored and evaluated.”30
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The Draft Standard’s ESIA requirement should be interpreted to
incorporate the FPIC requirements included in other parts of the
Draft Standard. This is consistent with the Inter-American Court
on Human Rights, which has held that:
The purpose of ESIAs is not only to have some objective
measure of such possible impact on the land and
the people, but also […] to ‘ensure that members of
the [affected community] are aware of possible risks,
including environmental and health risks, in order that the
proposed development or investment plan is accepted
knowingly and voluntarily’.31
The necessary incorporation of FPIC into impact assessment
requirements is also echoed by legal expert Dr. Cathal Doyle,
who posits that for impact assessments to be meaningful,
they “must be conducted at each stage in the decision-making
process where FPIC is required and provide an effective
participatory mechanism through which the nature and severity
of any potential limitations on indigenous peoples’ rights are
determined by, or in conjunction with, the concerned peoples.”32
In addition, the above interpretation is consistent with the
iterative nature of the Draft Standard’s FPIC requirement.
As noted above, while the Draft Standard identifies FPIC as
a necessary component to begin a sugarcane project, FPIC
cannot be obtained without ongoing, iterative processes for
consultation and the maintenance of consent throughout
the lifecycle of a project. This is consistent with the OECD’s
Guidance for Meaningful Stakeholder Engagement, itself a
point of reference within the Draft Standard’s requirement for
ESIA,33 which defines “meaningful stakeholder engagement”
as “ongoing engagement with stakeholders that is two-way,
conducted in good faith and responsive.”34
As described under Section 1.1, above, FPIC-compliant ESIA
process incorporating meaningful stakeholder engagement can
best be achieved by financing technical support to each affected
community. Community access to such technical expertise
and support would be facilitated by a requirement for relevant
operators to make regular contributions to a Basket Fund.
Finally, contributions to a Basket Fund for Responsible
Investment can help operationalize meaningful and empowered
community participation in the monitoring of an operator’s
obligations and project impacts.35 Involving communities in
monitoring can help create norms and pressure for greater
compliance with negotiated agreements, applicable laws, and
Bonsucro’s standards. Yet such monitoring efforts generally
require a degree of technical knowledge and resources; for
example, the Draft Standard instructs mills to measure dissolved
oxygen levels in receiving streams by utilizing a very specific
technical method.36 Community access to such technical
expertise would be facilitated by a requirement for relevant
4 | COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT

operators to make regular contributions to a Basket Fund.

Section 1.3. Dispute Resolution and Grievance Mechanisms
The Draft Standard should explicitly require operators to
make financial contributions to a Basket Fund for Responsible
Investment as a part of their efforts to meet the Draft Standard’s
requirement that operators have in place a grievance mechanism
that is compliant with the United Nations Guiding Principles on
Business and Human Rights (UNGPs).37
Criteria 1.3 requires the grievance mechanism to be accessible
to all parties, adapted for local use, “mutually agreed on,” and
allow for “complainants to choose individuals or groups to
support them and/or act as observers.” Allowing for communities
to choose the people to support them is meaningless without
also making sure the necessary funds are available, in an
independent manner, for the community to procure such
support. Rather than relying on operators to directly finance
third party experts, which, as described above, can introduce
risks of perceived or actual undue influence over communities,
the Draft Standard should require operators to make financial
contributions to a Basket Fund for Responsible Investment that
then finances technical support for affected communities.
The Draft Standard’s requirement that grievance mechanisms
are consistent with the expectations of the UNGPs includes
requirements that non-judicial grievance mechanisms be
“equitable” and “accessible,” among other characteristics. The
UNGPs explain that to be equitable, grievance mechanisms must
ensure aggrieved parties have “reasonable access to sources
of information, advice and expertise necessary to engage in a
grievance process on fair, informed and respectful terms.”38
Similarly, being “accessible” entails “providing adequate
assistance for those who may face barriers to access.”39 The
UNGPs also recognize that power imbalances often exist
between businesses and affected stakeholders in the context
of a dispute, and the resulting need for financial resources to
facilitate the community access to “information and expert
resources.”40 Requiring such funding to be paid by operators
into a Basket Fund for Responsible Investment is, therefore, a
promising way to effectively comply with the Draft Standard’s
requirement for a UNGP-compliant grievance mechanism.
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Section 2. Troubling Changes in Draft Production
Standard V5
The following table sets out some concerning features with the
Draft Standard solely as it relates to the sub-topics of this brief,
namely: FPIC and community participation in decision-making;
impact assessment and monitoring; and dispute resolution and
grievance mechanisms. It should not be taken as an exhaustive
review of the Draft Standard.

FPIC and Consultation
Previous Standard Language
Criterion 5.7: “For greenfield
expansion or new sugarcane
projects, to ensure transparent,
consultative and participatory
processes
that
address
cumulative and induced effects
via an environmental and social
impact assessment”

Draft Production Standard V5

Core Indicator 1.1.2 (Notes): The
operator shall have an identification,
prioritization and engagement plan
with interested and affected parties
(i.e. internal, external, directly,
indirectly impacted, and vulnerable
stakeholders, as well as indigenous,
tribal and traditional communities).
Criterion 5.8: “To ensure active The plan shall be revised at least
engagement and transparent, annually.
consultative and participatory
The
process
of
processes with all relevant (Guidance):
engaging with indigenous and
stakeholders”
tribal communities shall take into
consideration ILO Convention
169, guaranteeing indigenous
peoples the right to free, prior and
informed consent consultation and
guaranteeing good faith.

Discussion of Shortcomings
The elimination of express
requirements
and
guidance
for
operators
to
conduct
“transparent,
consultative
and
participatory
processes
with all relevant stakeholders”
throughout the lifecycle of a
project is concerning. While FPIC
is still required in Indicator 1.2.3,
the removal of a focus on process
risks encouraging operators to
take an “extractive” approach
to obtaining consent, rather
than emphasizing the rights of
affected community members to
be informed and to participate in
and influence decisions regarding
the project. The narrowing of
FPIC rights to Indigenous and
tribal communities in 1.1.2 is also
inconsistent with other mentions
of FPIC in the Draft Standard and
risks limiting the participation of
affected communities that are not
Indigenous or tribal.
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Impact Assessment and Participatory Monitoring
Previous Standard Language

Draft Production Standard V5

Discussion of Shortcomings

Criterion 5.7: “For greenfield expansion or new
sugarcane projects, to ensure transparent,
consultative and participatory processes that address
cumulative and induced effects via an environmental
and social impact assessment”

Core Indicator 4.1.6 (Guidance): An
ESIA process shall start prior to the
formulation phase of a project, focus
on significant issues and identify
stakeholders to involve them, consider
impacts on individuals with special
consideration for vulnerable ones,
and provide information on possible
alternative or appropriate mitigation
measures. Decisions shall be based on
meaningful engagement with affected
stakeholders (as defined by OECD),
monitored and evaluated.

The removal of express
mentions of FPIC from ESIA
requirements
implies
an
intention to avoid the FPIC
standard. We submit (in
section 1.2, above) that ESIA
requirements should still be
interpreted to incorporate an
FPIC requirement.

Core Indicator 5.7.1 (Notes): “ESIA process shall
start prior the formulation phase of a project, focus
on significant issues and involve key stakeholders
to identify them, provide information on possible
alternative or appropriate mitigation measures for
making decision based on free prior informed consent
(FPIC) process, monitor and evaluate implemented
measures.”
Core Indicator 4.1.3 (Notes): The EIMP addresses
key environmental issues: biodiversity, ecosystem
services, soil, water, air, climate change, use of crop
protection chemicals, use of artificial fertilisers, cane
burning and noise. The plan shall be implemented
and progress monitored. A summary of the EIMP
shall be made available to relevant stakeholders.

Core Indicator 1.1.4: “At minimum,
the impact assessment must cover
the core indicators of the Standard
including actual and potential impacts
of the operation on the environment,
workforce, and communities.”

Grievance Mechanisms and Dispute Resolution
Previous Standard Language

Draft Production Standard V5

Discussion of Shortcomings

Indicator 5.8.1 (Notes): “Ensure
that when dispute, grievances
and conflicts arise, the operator
acts appropriately to resolve them
through
negotiated
agreement
between parties based on Free, Prior
and Informed Consent”

Indicator 1.3.1: “operator must
have in place a mutually agreed
on and documented grievance
mechanism that meets the
expectations laid out in the UN
Guiding Principles for Business
and Human Rights”

Indicator 5.8.2: “Percentage of
projects involving multi stakeholders
where agreement has been reached
by consensus driven process based
on Free, Prior and Informed Consent”

No equivalent

Indicator 5.8.2 (Notes): “Negotiated
agreement shall be based on Free
Prior Informed Consent. Evidence of
negotiated agreements shall to be
demonstrated.”

No equivalent

While the framing of grievance mechanism
requirements in the context of the UN Guiding
Principles is helpful, the elimination of guidance
for operators to establish an FPIC-compliant
negotiated agreement with complainants following
the resolution of such a mechanism is a missed
opportunity to reiterate the iterative nature of the
FPIC requirement. This is especially important, given
that post-dispute resolution agreements can be an
important tool for communities and community
members to subsequently hold operators to account
and for regulating and facilitating communication
between communities and operators, including
establishing processes which can enable
communities to participate in and influence
decision-making moving forward. In addition, the
design and establishment of the mechanism itself
should be FPIC-compliant.
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Handbook on Human Rights Impact Assessment (2019), p. 136.
Bonsucro Draft Production Standard Version 5 (2020), Core Indicator 4.1.6, Guidance (“An ESIA process shall start prior to
the formulation phase of a project, focus on significant issues and identify stakeholders to involve them, consider impacts
on individuals with special consideration for vulnerable ones, and provide information on possible alternative or appropriate
mitigation measures. Decisions shall be based on meaningful engagement with affected stakeholders (as defined by OECD),
monitored and evaluated”).
OECD, OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Meaningful Stakeholder Engagement in the Extractive Sector, (2017), p. 82,
https://bit.ly/38R8p1O (emphasis added).
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Bonsucro Draft Production Standard Version 5, (2020), Principle 1 (“Assess and Manage Environmental, Social & Human
Rights Risks”, Principle 4 (“Actively Manage Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services”, and Principle 5 (“Continuously Improve
Other Key Areas of the Business”). See, especially, Guidance for Core Indicator 1.1.3 (“establish engagement processes with
displaced populations, implement a livelihood impact management plan, and track livelihood outcomes and mitigate and/
or reverse all adverse impacts of displacement”), Notes for Core Indicator 1.1.4 (“At minimum, the impact assessment must
cover…actual and potential impacts of the operation on the environment, workforce, and communities.”), Guidance for Core
Indicator 4.1.6 (“ESIA process shall […] focus on significant issues and identify stakeholders to involve them” […] “Decisions
shall be based on meaningful engagement with affected stakeholders (as defined by OECD), monitored and evaluated.
The operator shall involve independent third party experts”), Notes for Indicator 4.3.3 (“collaborative and collective action
to promote sustainable water use and participation with other water users […] to allocate water equitably and without
conflict”), and Notes for Indicator 5.1.4 (“Internal and external audit processes demonstrate that systems improvements
are ongoing”).
Bonsucro Draft Production Standard Version 5, (2020), Indicator 4.3.6. (“Dissolved oxygen is an indicator of the quantity
of oxygen available in the receiving stream to support life. Sampling should be carried at the discharging point”). See
Guidance from v.4.2 which details the analysis method, which remains unchanged in Draft Standard https://bit.ly/38W90iW
(“It should be noted that effluent flows from a mill vary considerably during the week and along the season. DO samples
should represent average conditions in the stream being monitored. […] DO analysis should be made using iodometric
(Winkler – reference method), luminescence-based (optical sensor), amperometric (probe) or spectrophotometric methods
of analysis, in line with local legislation if applicable. The protocol of measurement will depend on the methodology used”).
Bonsucro Draft Production Standard Version 5, (2020), Indicator 1.3.1 (“the operator must have in place a mutually agreed
on and documented grievance mechanism that meets the expectations laid out in the UN Guiding Principles for Business
and Human Rights: Legitimate, Accessible, Predictable, Equitable, Transparent, Rights-compatible, a source of continuous
learning and based on stakeholder engagement”). See, especially, para 3 (noting “Procedures are in place to ensure that
the system is effectively communicated to and understood by” local communities) and para 5 (noting “The system allows
for complainants to choose individuals or groups to support them and/or act as observers”).
OHCHR, United Nations Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights (UNGPs), Article 31(d).
UNGPs, Art. 31(b).
UNGPs, Art. 31, Commentary, para (d) (“In grievances or disputes between business enterprises and affected stakeholders,
the latter frequently have much less access to information and expert resources, and often lack the financial resources to
pay for them. Where this imbalance is not redressed, it can reduce both the achievement and perception of a fair process
and make it harder to arrive at durable solutions”).
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